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THE STATE, THE STORK, AND THE WALL:
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND
STATUTORY ABORTION
REGULATION
The first amendment prohibits the enactment of laws respecting the estab-
lishment of religion.' The United States Supreme Court has held that the
rights guaranteed by the establishment clause are fundamental and are appli-
cable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.2 The Framers of the
Constitution drafted the establishment clause based on their fear that reli-
gious denominations that receive the benefits of state law pose a threat to
individual liberties. From its inception, the focus of the establishment
clause has been neutrality,4 neutrality not only among sects, but also among
believers and nonbelievers.5 Some members of the Court have asserted that
this neutrality should take the form of "a wall of separation between church
and State."6 Other members of the Court reject this approach because it
places religion in a vacuum.7 Regardless of the approach, the Court consist-
ently holds that the establishment clause protects fundamental rights that
"no government official in this Nation may violate."8
In an attempt to avoid biased and inconsistent decisions, the Court has
sought to develop a rational test for establishment clause challenges. The
Supreme Court's decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman9 compiled and clarified
existing establishment clause doctrine into a test designed to preserve a stat-
ute that appears to violate the establishment clause. In order to preserve
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
3. See generally J. MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS (1795) (outlining Madison's objections to the establishment of religion), re-
printed in part in Everson v. Board of Edue., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
5. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
6. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Everson, 330
U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
7. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
8. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3099 (1989).
9. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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such a statute, the state must demonstrate: a secular purpose for the statute,
a primary effect of the statute which neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and freedom from excessive entanglement between the state and religion. 0
In defining the parameters of this test, the Court has held that even the
smallest step toward the advancement of religion violates the test.1 Fur-
ther, the Court has held that a statute that implicates the establishment
clause must have a "clearly" legislative purpose, 2 and that, when founded
on a denominational basis, the Court will apply strict scrutiny to the statute
in question. 13 Independent of the Lemon criteria, a statute may be invalid if
it aligns the government on one side of a political issue divided along reli-
gious lines.14 Additionally, the Court allows an exception to these general
principles where a certain practice, while appearing to violate the establish-
ment clause, has a long history of noninterference with secular affairs and
institutions.15
Today, American society faces few issues as volatile as abortion. Despite
the obvious role of religion in the abortion debate, the Court, with the excep-
tion of Justice Stevens' dissent in one of the Court's recent pronouncements
on abortion,' 6 has rejected claims that antiabortion statutes violate the estab-
lishment clause.17 Instead, the Court continues to involve itself in the un-
10. Id. at 612-13.
11. Id at 612.
12. Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
13. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
14. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 795-98.
15. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (holding that religious blue
laws, requiring the closing of stores on Sundays, do not violate the establishment clause).
16. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3082-85 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Indeed, I am persuaded that the absence of any secular purpose for the legislative
declarations that life begins at conception and that conception occurs at fertilization
makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid under the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This conclusion ... rests on
the fact that the preamble, an unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some
but by no means all Christian faiths, serves no identifiable secular purpose. That fact
alone compels a conclusion that the statute violates the Establishment Clause.
Bolstering my conclusion that the preamble violates the First Amendment is the
fact that the intensely divisive character of much of the national debate over the
abortion issue reflects the deeply held religious convictions of many participants in
the debate. The Missouri Legislature may not inject its endorsement of a particular
religious tradition into this debate, for "[t]he Establishment Clause does not allow
public bodies to foment such disagreement."
Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3132
(1989)) (footnotes omitted).
17. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see infra notes 242-50 and accompanying text
(critiquing the Court's cursory treatment of claimed establishment clause violations).
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ending debate regarding Roe v. Wade. " Decided in 1973, Roe protects the
right of a woman to have an abortion. 9 Roe, however, relied not on textual
arguments, but on certain "zones of privacy" that emanated from the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment.2'
This Comment suggests that the abortion debate should move away from
the present quagmire involving privacy rights, and back to the textual con-
stitutional analysis found in establishment clause cases. This Comment ar-
gues that establishment clause analysis is grounded firmly in legal precedent,
making it an ideal tool to analyze an issue involving a great deal of personal
21emotion.
After outlining the history and development of establishment clause tests,
this Comment analyzes antiabortion statutes in terms of the establishment
clause. This Comment concludes that such statutes lack a secular purpose,
benefit specific religious organizations, unnecessarily entangle church and
state, and place the state on one side of a political issue which is divided
along religious lines, thus violating the establishment clause.22 This Com-
ment advocates that the Supreme Court adopt the use of the establishment
clause in analyzing antiabortion statutes because such an approach provides
judges with sound constitutional precedent which relates to the fundamental
issue underlying the abortion debate-religion.
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. Id. at 154.
20. Roe protects the right of a woman to choose to abort a pregnancy through the second
trimester. After the second trimester, the fetus becomes viable and the state has a compelling
interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. The legal grounds for the Court's decision
rested on the fourteenth amendment concept of personal liberty, implying a right of privacy.
There is no textual guarantee of privacy in the Constitution, leading to the perceived weakness
of decisions based on privacy rights. The reasoning underlying Roe is that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citing Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Such emanations were per-
ceived as creating zones of privacy; in Roe, the zone surrounded the woman's choice to termi-
nate her pregnancy.
21. As the lower court's finding in McRae v. Califano indicates, a successful challenge to
an antiabortion statute could be brought using the free exercise clause. Although the establish-
ment clause and free exercise clause are closely tied to each other, this Comment does not
consider the free exercise clause in the context of abortion. 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1980),
rev'd sub. nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
22. This Comment, however, will point out that such a determination, while allowing
some abortions, offers certain guarantees to members of the antiabortion movement.
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I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Building a Wall:
Madison, Jefferson, and the Creation of the Establishment
Clause
The development of the establishment clause began five years before its
ratification, when James Madison fought the Virginia Assessment Bill.2"
This bill proposed to authorize the Commonwealth to use tax revenues to
support Christian churches and organizations.24 Before the Virginia legisla-
ture could pass the bill, Madison organized and wrote his Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,25 which outlined his objections
to the Assessment Bill. He focused both on the freedom to exercise religion
and freedom from the establishment of religion. Madison appealed to com-
mon sense, and asked, "[w]ho does not see that the same authority which
can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish
with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other
Sects?"26 Madison continued and explained that ecclesiastical establish-
ments historically have had a significant impact on civil society. In particu-
lar, Madison noted that ecclesiastical establishments "have been seen to
erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of Civil authority; in many instances
they have been seen upholding the thrones of political tyranny; in no in-
stance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties of the people."27
The need to accommodate the religious diversity of immigrants in
America also motivated Madison. Indeed, Madison saw America as an
"asylum to the persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and Religion."2
Madison, therefore, cautioned against political involvement in divisive reli-
gious issues
[b]ecause, it will destroy that moderation and harmony which the
forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion, has pro-
duced amongst its several sects. Torrents of blood have been spilt
in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular arm to extinguish
Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious
opinions. 29
23. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 704-05 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
24. Id. at 717 (Appendix I).
25. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 37 (1947).
26. Walz, 397 U.S. at 721.
27. Id. at 724 (Appendix II).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 725. Avoidance of government mingling in religious disputes is effectuated in
the political divisiveness test. See infra notes 156-76 and accompanying text.
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Madison was victorious in Virginia, 3 and succeeded in convincing the
Framers of the Constitution to include protection of religious freedoms in
the Bill of Rights.3
Madison's victory in Virginia led to passage of the Virginia Statute of
Religious Liberty,32 written by Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson felt so strongly
about the separation of church and state that he had the passage of the Vir-
ginia Statute of Religious Liberty listed on his tombstone as one of his great-
est accomplishments.33 Understandably, considering Jefferson's concern
with religious freedom, hearing that the draft of the United States Constitu-
tion lacked a religious clause dismayed Jefferson. 4
Because of Madison's continued efforts, however, when the first Congress
convened, the first amendment to the Constitution included the protection of
religious freedoms.3" Although he was in France when the amendment was
drafted and ratified,36 Jefferson's vision of the first amendment still persists
today: "[A] wall of separation between church and State."37 While Jeffer-
son and Madison seemed unambiguous in their support for a separation of
church and state, the Court has since struggled to apply this principle in a
consistent manner.38
30. Waliz 397 U.S. at 704-05.
31. Id. at 705-06.
32. "That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place,
or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body
or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief ...." Ever-
son, 330 U.S. at 12-13 (quoting Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty).
33. R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 36 (1982). To put the importance of
the Virginia Bill in perspective, it is worth noting that there are two other accomplishments
Jefferson listed on his tombstone: founding the University of Virginia and authoring the Dec-
laration of American Independence. Id.
34. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878).
35. Walz 397 U.S. 664, 705-06.
36. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163 (1878).
37. Id at 164
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his
God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legisla-
tive powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,-I contemplate
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that
their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between
church and State.
Id (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I) (emphasis added).
38. Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (release program held constitu-
tional) with McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (release program held unconsti-
tutional) (although both programs involved nearly identical release programs, the Court
reached completely contrary results within five years of one another).
1990] 1195
Catholic University Law Review
B. Sitting on the Wall:
The Court's Struggle to Develop a Coherent Test for
Establishment Clause Challenges
The United States Supreme Court failed to reach establishment clause is-
sues in several early challenges; 39 the Court waited until 1947 to offer its first
conclusive interpretations of the establishment clause.' Since that time, the
Court has continued to uphold the underlying values enunciated by Madison
and Jefferson,4 but debate still exists as to how solid Jefferson's wall should
be.42
In 1947, the Supreme Court decided the case of Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation.4 3 In Everson, a local taxpayer challenged a New Jersey statute that
allowed parents reimbursement for the cost of transporting their children to
parochial schools on public school buses. The Court, after reviewing colo-
nial America's fear of state endorsed religion, identified the minimum stan-
dards of establishment clause protection." At a minimum, the Court stated,
the establishment clause prohibited a state from setting up a religion, passing
any law that aided one or all religions, and expressing a preference for one
religion over another.45
The Court also advocated the continued use of Jefferson's wall of separa-
tion." The Court then considered the issue of whether, in an attempt to
maintain this wall, the establishment clause required members of religious
groups to surrender public benefits which they had earned as citizens. The
Court ruled that New Jersey "cannot exclude individual[s] . . . because of
their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legisla-
tion."' 47 Although the Court stated that "[t]he First Amendment... erected
a wall between church and state [which] must be kept high and impregna-
ble,"'41 the Court ruled that the New Jersey Statute could stand under a
39. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291
(1899).
40. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41. Note, The Separation of Church and State-A Debate, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 895, 896.
42. See id. (outlining traditional battle lines regarding the establishment clause).
43. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
44. Id. at 15-16.
45. Id. Specifically, the Court asserted that:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another ....
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
48. Id. at 18.
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theory of social benefit.4 9 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Jackson criticized
the majority for failing to apply its legal reasoning to its ultimate ruling in
the case.50 While the Court painstakingly enumerated the criteria to use
when analyzing the establishment clause, it seemingly ignored these criteria
in making its decision.5"
Perhaps as a result of the Court's ultimate ruling in Everson, which
seemed at odds with the criteria it had set forth, the Everson criteria were
challenged within the year. In Illinois ex reL McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion,52 the Court held unconstitutional an Illinois School Board practice
which permitted students to attend sectarian classes, taught by parochial
school teachers, within public schools." In its decision, the Court expressly
upheld the Everson ruling that the establishment clause protected more than
avoiding the preference of one religion over another.54 In addition, the
Court offered a glimpse into the future development of the entanglement
49. Id. at 17. Under this theory, any benefit to which a citizen was entitled could not be
denied because it went to a religious group, for the denial would be hostile to religion and
equally violative of the establishment clause. See infra note 51 for a discussion of the dilemma
this created.
50. Justice Jackson equated the majority's stance with Byron's Julia, who, "whispering 'I
will ne'er consent,'- consented." Everson, 330 U.S. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (taken from
Lord Byron's Don Juan).
51. The Court's failure to use the criteria was, however, justifiable. In Everson, the legisla-
tors' goal in passing the bussing statute was not to benefit religion, but to benefit its citizens.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. For the legislators to have not provided the bussing would have
inferred a hostile attitude toward religion-also a violation of the first amendment. Id. at 16.
The dilemma of whether providing general benefits to religious groups violates the establish-
ment clause arises not only from the Court's decision in Everson, but also from the dual protec-
tions of the first amendment itself, assuring both freedom of religion and prevention of
establishment. These two goals often leave government in the middle of a tug of war. As one
commentator explained:
Problems of complexity, formality, and ambiguity have plagued Establishment
Clause doctrine since (Everson] .... Everson created a dilemma when it simultane-
ously adopted two different and incompatible conceptions of Establishment Clause
neutrality-a separationist conception prohibiting aid to religion and an accom-
modationist conception allowing religious participation in secular governmental pro-
grams of general social benefit. This placed the Court in an impossible doctrinal
situation. The contrary demands of these two conceptions of neutrality applied to
the facts of the case doomed the Court's decision to unavoidable conflict with one or
the other of its professed standards.
Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITr. L. REv. 83,
86 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
52. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
53. Id. at 205.
54. Id. at 211. Respondents argued that the establishment clause was intended only to
avoid preference of one religion over another; and, that the ruling in Everson, applying the
establishment clause to the states through the fourteenth amendment, should be limited or
overruled. The Court replied, "we are unable to accept either of these contentions." Id
1990] 1197
Catholic University Law Review
test. 55 The Court announced that the "First Amendment rests upon the
premise that both religion and government can bei work to achieve their
lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere." 5' 6
The broad language of Everson had survived its first challenge.
While the Court's support of Everson seemed firm in McCollum, the Court
did an abrupt about-face in regard to the extent of separation between
church and state just four years later in Zorach v. Clauson. 5' Zorach in-
volved a New York City program which allowed students to leave public
schools in order to attend sectarian classes at parochial schools. The Court
stated that "[t]here cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment
reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be separated [and,]
within the scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is ab-
solute.""8 Yet despite this unequivocal language, the Court qualified its
statement in the next sentence: "The First Amendment, however, does not
say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and
State." 59
In light of these inconsistent statements, the Court found that the release
program did not violate the establishment clause.' This inconsistency may,
however, have had little practical effect on its decision, for it appears that the
Court focused more on historical precedent than legal precedent in reaching
its decision in Zorach. Specifically, the Court stated: "We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."'"
Justice Jackson dissented in Zorach, explaining that the New York City
release plan used the power of the state, in the form of truant officers, to
enforce attendance at sectarian classes, thereby violating the establishment
clause.62 Amazed by the majority's reasoning, Justice Jackson commented:
"The wall which the Court was professing to erect between Church and
State has become even more warped and twisted than I expected. Today's
55. Id at 212. The entanglement test forms the third prong of the three part test later
developed in Lemon See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text. The entanglement test
examines whether a particular law creates a relationship between secular and sectarian institu-
tions-a relationship which could result in the undue influence of one upon the other. See
infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
56. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.
57. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
58. Id. at 312.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 315.
61. Id. at 313. The use of such historical arguments has become an important factor in
establishment clause analysis, often used to uphold statutes that appear to be clear violations of
the establishment clause. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (permitting state
to pay for preacher to open legislative sessions).
62. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 323-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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judgment will be more interesting to students of psychology and of the judi-
cial processes than to students of constitutional law."63 While Justice Jack-
son's criticism of the Court's application of factual patterns to its own test
was particularly potent, it was not to be the last.
In Torcaso v. Watkins," the Court ruled that a Maryland law requiring
public officials to declare their belief in God violated the establishment
clause. Maryland argued that the Court's decision in Zorach overruled the
broad language found in Everson,65 thus "open[ing] up the way for govern-
ment.., to restore the historically and constitutionally discredited policy of
probing religious beliefs by test oaths."" The Court expressly denied such a
ruling, pointing to an express statement in Zorach reaffirming the Court's
decision in Everson.6 Moreover, the Torcaso court underscored its own
commitment to the broad interpretation of Everson." The Court specifically
stated: "We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal
Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbe-
lief in any religion.' ,69
Although Torcaso, Zorach, and McCollum differ substantively, these cases
highlight a major problem in establishment clause adjudication: the under-
lying principles are continuously endorsed, but inconsistently applied.
When the Court decided Engel v. Vitale, TO it determined that its views on
the establishment clause were clear and did not need citation. 7' In overturn-
ing a New York law that required teachers to open classes with the Regent's
71prayer, the Court made it clear that government involvement with religion
63. Id. at 325.
64. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
65. Id. at 494; see infra note 67.
66. Id. at 494.
67. Id.
The Maryland Court of Appeals thought, and it is argued here, that this Court's later
holding and opinion in [Zorach], had in part repudiated the statement in the Everson
opinion quoted above and previously reaffirmed in McCollum. But the Court's opin-
ion in Zorach specifically stated: "We follow the McCollum case." Nothing decided
or written in Zorach lends support to the idea that the Court there intended to [de-
crease the protections of the establishment clause].
Id. (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 495.
69. Id.
70. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
71. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 220-21 (1963), stating that
"in Engel v. Vitale, only last year, these principles were so universally recognized that the
Court, without the citation of a single case and over the sole dissent of Mr. Justice Stewart,
reaffirmed them." Id. (citations omitted).
72. "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy bless-
ings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174,
177, 176 N.E.2d 579, 580, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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amounted to coercion of those with other beliefs." The Court indicated that
states should avoid such combinations between church and state because,
when government became involved with religion, it resulted in "the hatred,
disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs."'74 As the
Engel decision indicated, the broad interpretations of Everson were intact;
thus, the Engel Court exposed the Zorach decision as an anomaly, an awk-
ward decision tossed into the broad language of Everson.
Justice Jackson was not alone in his belief that the Court had created a
"warped and twisted" wall of separation.7- Facing mounting criticism, the
Supreme Court made its first attempt to articulate a clear and coherent es-
tablishment clause test in School District of Abington v. Schempp.76 In
Schempp, the Court examined Pennsylvania and Maryland laws requiring
teachers to open classes each day with a reading from the Bible." In its
analysis, the Court carefully outlined the history of its establishment clause
decisions.78 The Court emphasized that the fourteenth amendment made
the establishment clause applicable to the states,79 that the establishment
clause was not limited to avoiding the preference of one religion over an-
other,80 and that the goal of the establishment clause "was to create a com-
plete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil
authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support
for religion.""1
The Schempp Court also articulated its objective in establishment clause
cases as the maintenance of "wholesome 'neutrality.' "82 In addition, the
73. "When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform
to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
74. Id. (footnote omitted).
75. See, e.g., Recent Decisions, 21 U. CiNN. L. REv. 481, 483 (1952) (indicating the irrec-
oncilability of Zorach and McCollum).
76. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
77. Id. at 205-12.
78. Id. at 213-22.
79. Id at 215.
80. Id. at 216.
81. Id. at 217 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting)). The reiteration of these principles was not a direct result of issues raised by the
parties. Writing for the Court, Justice Clark appeared to indicate that the Court had become
sensitive to criticisms regarding its establishment clause decisions:
While none of the parties to either of these cases has questioned these basic conclu-
sions of the Court, both of which have been long established, recognized and consist-
ently reaffirmed, others continue to question their history, logic and efficacy. Such
contentions, in light of the consistent interpretation in cases of this Court, seem en-
tirely untenable and of value only as academic exercises.
82. 14d at 222.
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Court noted that history has demonstrated that "powerful sects or groups
might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a con-
cert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of
the State ... would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodox-
ies." 3 While the Court did not include this reasoning in the test later pro-
posed in Schempp,s4 the Court's language indicated the continuing
development of the entanglement test.8 5
While it failed to fully develop and incorporate the entanglement test, the
Schempp Court, relying on a restatement of its prior decisions, created a
long-awaited test for establishment clause challenges. 6 Attempting to con-
solidate existing doctrine, the Court announced its establishment clause test:
"What are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope
of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution." ' Under this
test, in order to withstand a challenge under the establishment clause, a stat-
ute must have "a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."88 The Court's use of secular purpose ap-
peared to include two elements of its previous decisions interpreting the es-
tablishment clause. First, it implied a certain element of improper legislative
motive. Second, the Court's emphasis on secular purpose integrated the
concept of the benefit approach. 9
The Court, applying its new test, found that reading the Bible and reciting
the King's prayer in public schools violated the establishment clause.' The
Court noted that the reading of these prayers had no secular purpose,91 and
impermissibly aided religion by advancing the tenets of Christianity.92
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(citing Schempp in a subsequent expansion of the entanglement test).
86. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
87. Id
88. Id
89. The rationale of the benefit approach is that while government may not pass laws
specifically to benefit religious groups, it similarly may not deny religious groups the benefits to
which all citizens of a state are entitled. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947). The busing scheme at issue in Everson could easily have been settled under the new
test because the state had an interest in safely transporting its citizens to their schools. Id at
17-18. Although such a plan aids parochial schools, the state had a secular interest in safe-
guarding the students' transportation to and from school, which is within the scope of legiti-
mate state interests. Id.; see also CORD, supra note 33, at 196-98.
90. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-24.
91. Id. at 224.
92. Id
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Justice Brennan, concurring with the majority decision in Schempp, reiter-
ated and expanded the concept of government neutrality towards religion.
Specifically, Justice Brennan stated that the government "may not officially
involve religion in such a way as to prefer, discriminate against, or oppress a
particular sect or religion."'9 3 In addition to the general concept of neutral-
ity, Justice Brennan extracted three principles underlying all establishment
clause cases.
The first and most important principle was that government should not
become involved in ecclesiastical disputes.94 In support of this proposition,
Justice Brennan focused on United States v. Ballard,9 holding that a defend-
ant accused of fraudulent use of the mails could not introduce evidence that
he distributed truthful religious documents.96 Justice Brennan stated that
the Ballard ruling indicated that "the First Amendment foreclosed any judi-
cial inquiry into the truth or falsity of ... religious beliefs."97 Moreover,
Justice Brennan did not confine this limitation to the courts; he stated that it
is essential to "give effect to the First Amendment's purpose of requiring on
the part of all organs of government a strict neutrality toward theological
questions."9" Justice Brennan's conclusion that government may not be-
come involved in debates divided along religious lines provided the ground-
work for the subsequent development of the political divisiveness test in
establishment clause challenges.99
Second, Justice Brennan indicated that, although the free exercise and es-
tablishment clauses were closely related, the Court should treat each clause
independently. " Third, Justice Brennan asserted that the Court should
consider relevant free exercise doctrines when the establishment clause is the
basis of a challenge."1 Realizing the complexity of the issue, Justice Bren-
nan warned, "[W]e must not confuse the issue of governmental power to
regulate or prohibit conduct motivated by religious beliefs with the quite dif-
ferent problem of governmental authority to compel behavior offensive to
religious principles."102 Justice Brennan found the former permissible if the
93. Id. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 243-44.
95. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
96. Id. at 88.
97. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 244 (Brennan, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 243.
99. Id. at 243, 246.
100. Justice Brennan noted that this approach had only recently developed, describing Ev-
erson as "the first of our decisions which treats a problem of asserted unconstitutional involve-
ment as raising questions purely under the Establishment Clause." Id at 246.
101. Id at 249.
102. Id. at 250 (emphasis in original).
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legislation in question was "for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace,
good order and morals of society,"' 1 3 and the latter permissible if there was
a "strong state interest" behind the statute.' °" In short, Justice Brennan
acknowledged that laws affecting religious beliefs and conduct must have a
secular purpose.
The Court's next opportunity to apply its establishment clause test arose
five years later in Board of Education v. Allen. 05 In Allen, the Court ruled
that a New York City law, which required school districts to loan textbooks
to parochial schools, did not violate the establishment clause."° The New
York legislature's findings indicated that the state intended the statute to
promote public welfare and safety.'10 The Court, first applying the Everson
benefit approach,' 08 suggested that the law was valid because the law was
only part of a general program designed to benefit students." 9 The Court
then invoked the Schempp test." 0
From the outset, the Court appeared uncomfortable with the Schempp
test, and noted that "[t]his test is not easy to apply.""' The Court hesi-
tantly applied the new test and found that the State had a legitimate interest
in providing children with textbooks." 2 The Court based its judgment on
the conclusion that "in addition to their sectarian function, [the parochial
schools performed] the task of secular education."1 3 While the Court easily
articulated the secular purpose, it never fully evaluated the question of
whether the primary effect of the statute was to advance religion."'
103. Id. Brennan based his analysis on Hamilton v. Regents of University of California,
293 U.S. 245 (1934), where the court ruled that students could be compelled to participate in
military drills even though such drills were against their religious convictions. The decision
was, however, narrowly construed because attendance at the University was voluntary. Id.
104. Id. at 251. Any doubt that motive was part of purpose was dispelled in Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), where the Court ruled that it is proper to examine motive when
determining the presence of a secular purpose. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
105. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
106. Id. at 238.
107. Id. at 239.
108. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
109. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243.
110. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); see supra notes 86-88
and accompanying text.
111. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243.
112. Id. The Court, however, assumed that the school bureaucracy would ensure the
transfer of secular textbooks only, an assumption strongly criticized by Justice Douglas. See
id. at 254-56 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 248.
114. Id.
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Although Justice Harlan concurred in the opinion, 15 he did so by com-
bining the secular purpose and excessive entanglement tests. 116 Justice
Harlan proposed that a statute would pass constitutional muster if, in addi-
tion to a secular purpose, "the activity [did] not involve the State 'so signifi-
cantly and directly in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to [the]
divisive influences and inhibitions of freedom.' "117 While Justice Harlan's
analysis stood as significant evidence of the continuing development of the
entanglement clause, his analysis still subordinated entanglement as a corol-
lary to the secular purpose test. 1 8
Justice Black, in dissent, did not hesitate to criticize the majority's opin-
ion; he described the statute as a "flat, flagrant, open violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments which together forbid Congress or state legis-
latures to enact any law 'respecting an establishment of religion.' ""9 Jus-
tice Black reasoned that the law's primary effect relieved parochial schools
from the cost of textbooks, and amounted to state aid for religion. 12 Ac-
cordingly, Justice Black urged the invalidation of the statute under the es-
tablishment clause as an impermissible aid to religion.1 21
The Court's decision in Allen failed to assuage complaints about the in-
consistencies of the Court's establishment clause cases.1 22 The fundamental
problem remained the same: While the Court called for separation, it con-
tinued to allow aid to religious organizations. 123 In Walz v. Tax Commission
115. Id. at 249 (Harlan, J., concurring).
116. Id
117. Id. (quoting School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963)).
118. It was not until the Court's decision in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397
U.S. 664 (1970), that the Court recognized entanglement as an independent test. "[I]n Walz v.
Tax Commission the Court supplemented this test with an independent measure of constitu-
tionality. That is, does the program foster 'excessive government entanglement with religion
.... '" Note, Excessive Entanglement: A New Dimension to the Parochial Aid Controversy
Under the First Amendment, 3 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 73, 77 (1972).
The independent excessive entanglement test offers an important additional barrier between
church and state arising particularly with regard to legislation that while having a secular
purpose and general benefit, creates the existence of a long-term relationship between church
and state. The test's potency may lie in the ability of the excessive entanglement test to dis-
mantle statutes that, while made to appear secular, have deeply ingrained religious objectives.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
119. Allen, 392 U.S. at 250 (Black, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 253.
121. Id. at 252. "The First Amendment's bar to establishment of religion must preclude a
State from using funds levied from all of its citizens to purchase books for use by sectarian
schools, which, although 'secular,' realistically will in some way inevitably tend to propagate
the religious views of the favored sect." Id.
122. Note, Recent Decisions, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 286, 291 (1969).
123. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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of New York 24 the Court acknowledged that its previous holdings had cre-
ated an amorphous series of tests which lead to unpredictable decisions.'25
Once again, the Court set out to create a new establishment clause test.
In Walz, the petitioner asked the Court to grant an injunction to prevent
the tax commissioner from granting property tax exemptions to religious
organizations. At the outset, the Court indicated that it intended to take a
new direction in analyzing establishment clause challenges. The Court
stated, "The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court
derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on
aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases
but have limited meaning as general principles."' 26 Even the long inviolate
concept of neutrality was attacked: "[W]e will not tolerate either govern-
mentally established religion or governmental interference with religion.
Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play
in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference."' 27 Such be-
nevolence seems a far cry from "wholesome neutrality"' 28 and "the wall of
separation,"' 29 the Court's previous touchstones. Having dismantled twenty
years of precedent, the Court turned to a new test-intent. 30
In focusing on the new test of intent, the Court did not completely aban-
don all precedent. Convinced that the legislature did not intend to establish
religion, the Court applied an independent excessive entanglement test. 131
This marked the first time the Court used the entanglement test as more
than a buttress for a secular purpose decision.' 32 The Court's test examined
"whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one
calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible
degree of entanglement."'' 33 The Court did not strictly apply this test,
124. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
125. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
126. Walz 397 U.S. at 668.
127. Id. at 669.
128. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
129. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
130. "Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses must therefore turn on whether
particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and prac-
tices or have the effect of doing so." Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added).
131. "Determining [there is no intent to promote religion] does not end the inquiry, how-
ever. We must also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government
entanglement with religion." Id at 674 (emphasis added).
132. See supra note 118.
133. Walz. 397 U.S. at 675.
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choosing instead to view the issue in an historical context. 13  The historical
approach utilized in Walz offers the best example of an apparent exception
for certain activities that, while clearly appearing to violate the establish-
ment clause, have a history of peaceful coexistence with secular institutions
and government. Under the Court's proposed entanglement test, it would be
difficult to argue that tax exemptions, requiring constant state monitoring,
do not entangle the Church and the State. The Court overlooked this fact
and instead applied an historical exception because "two centuries of unin-
terrupted freedom from taxation has [not] given the remotest sign of leading
to an established church or religion."' 135
While the Court managed to clarify and expand excessive entanglement
and the historical exemption, its narrow view of neutrality and rejection of
the Schempp test effectively eliminated what little progress had been made in
constructing a coherent test for establishment clause challenges. 136
Although frustrated, the Court soon created a lasting test for such
challenges.
C. Modern Establishment Clause Doctrine:
Lemon v. Kurtzman and Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist
The greatest accomplishment of the Walz decision was the Court's realiza-
tion that its decisions contained significant internal inconsistencies. While
openly acknowledging the flaws in its prior decisions, the Court failed to
resolve the confusion surrounding these decisions, and may have compli-
cated the situation by disregarding the fairly coherent test articulated in
Schempp. Fortunately, with the decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman, '37 the
Court soon filled the void left by Walz...a
In Lemon, the Court focused on two statutory schemes. The first, the
Rhode Island Supplement Act, 139 allowed state officials to "supplement the
salaries of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools by
paying directly to a teacher an amount not in excess of 15% of his current
134. Id at 668; see also infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 678.
136. "The majority opinion in Walz implicitly rejects th[e] theory [of the strict separation
proposed in the Schempp test] .... " Note, Recent Cases, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 569, 584 (1970).
137. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
138. The significance of the Court's decision in Lemon cannot be overstated. In light of
two decades of confusion surrounding the establishment clause, the Lemon decision is a mas-
terpiece of condensation. More importantly, the tests outlined in the Lemon decision have, to
this day, survived intact. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S.
Ct. 3086 (1989).
139. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-51-1 (Supp. 1970).
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annual salary."' 4 The second scheme, the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act, 14 1 allowed reimbursements to non-
public schools for "secular educational services." '142 These reimbursements
included textbooks, salaries, and instructional materials.
1 43
While acknowledging that it could "only dimly perceive the lines of de-
marcation," 1" the Court created a clear establishment clause test in Lemon.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger indicated that the Court's
narrow view in Walz was an anomaly,'4 5 and stressed that the Court should
broadly interpret the establishment clause to prevent even "a step that could
lead to... establishment."' 14 6 Under this broad interpretation, the Court's
primary focus moved to the "three main evils against which the Establish-
ment Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial sup-
port, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.' "147 To
ensure protection from these "primary evils,"' 41 the Court reinstated the
Schempp test.'4 9 The Court, however, went one step further and included
excessive entanglement as the third prong to its test. As the Lemon Court
stated: "Three ... tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary ef-
fect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the stat-
ute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
140. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607.
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (Supp. 1971) (repealed 1977).
142. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 612.
145. Id. at 614.
146. Id. at 612.
The language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is at best opaque,
particularly when compared with other portions of the Amendment. Its authors did
not simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a state religion .... In-
stead they commanded that there should be "no law respecting an establishment of
religion." A law may be one "respecting" the forbidden objective while falling short
of its total realization.... A given law might not establish a state religion but never-
theless be one "respecting" that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to
such establishment and hence offend the First Amendment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
The emphasis of the terms "establishment" and "respecting" indicates the Court's desire
that the establishment clause be broadly read. Initial colonial concerns revolved around a fear
of state sponsored churches, which were "established" as the official church, thus receiving a
virtual monopoly of religious power. Use of the term "respecting" intentionally moves beyond
absolute sponsorship to include any action which might, no matter how unlikely, threaten a
return of established churches. Id.
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religion.' ""5" In evaluating the secular purpose of a statute, the Court in-
quired into the presence of any facts tending to undermine the stated legisla-
tive intent; absent such a showing, the Court deferred to the stated legislative
intent.15' In Lemon, the Court found nothing that undermined the stated
legislative purposes of the two acts. It therefore proceeded to the question of
entanglement. 15 2
In addressing entanglement, the Court recognized that "[s]ome relation-
ship between government and religious organizations is inevitable."' 5 3 To
determine which religious entanglements with government were excessive,
the Court examined "the character and purposes of the institutions that are
benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and the religious authority."' 54 The
Court found that both the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes violated
the entanglement test because the state would have to monitor the schools
consistently to make sure that schools did not use secular funds for sectarian
purposes, thus creating a long term relationship between Church and
State.' 55
In addition to the entanglement criteria it previously listed, the Court
adopted a political divisiveness test'56 and integrated it into the entangle-
ment test.'5 7 The Court viewed the political divisiveness test as crucial, say-
ing that "[p]olitical division along religious lines was one of the principal
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect."' 58 Gov-
ernment must avoid participation in such debates, the Court noted, because
to do otherwise would divert resources away from the resolution of secular
issues. " The Court ruled that the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes
violated the political divisiveness test because the funding bills for parochial
schools would arise every year and that the "[p]olitical fragmentation and
150. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674) (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 613.
152. Id.
153. Id at 614.
154. Id. at 615.
155. Id. at 621-22.
156. The political divisiveness test examines whether the government has aligned itself on
one side of a political debate divided along religious lines. Id. at 622.
157. "A broader base of entanglement of yet a different character is presented by the divi-
sive political potential of these state programs." Id.
158. Id
159. "It conflicts with our whole history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion
Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our elections that they could
divert attention from the myriad [of] issues and problems that confront every level of govern-




divisiveness on religious lines are thus likely to be intensified. '""W Viewing
the political divisiveness test as an adjunct to the entanglement test, the
Court ruled that the statutes also violated the entanglement test because of
political divisiveness caused by the need for constant monitoring to avoid
politicization of religious issues. 6" Within two years, however, the political
divisiveness test appeared severed from the entanglement test, perhaps mak-
ing political divisiveness an independent test. 162
In Committee for Public Education and Liberty v. Nyquist, '63 the Court
held a New York statute, which provided maintenance and tuition reim-
bursement grants to parochial schools, invalid under the establishment
clause.'" Applying the Lemon test, the Court found the statutes unconsti-
tutional as an impermissible advancement of religion. 165 The Court resolved
the issue using the second prong of the Lemon test, but also discussed the
political divisiveness test. 166 The Court distinguished two types of entangle-
ment. "[A]part from any specific entanglement of the State in particular
religious programs, assistance of the sort here involved carries grave poten-
tial for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over
aid to religion."' 167 The Court's use of the word "apart" appeared to create
an independent test centered on political divisiveness. The Court's decision
illustrated its concern regarding the history of religious groups that sought
to impose their will on others by using the strength of government. 16  Ap-
plying the political divisiveness test, the Court ruled that the New York plan
violated the establishment clause because the plan involved a deeply emo-
tional church-state issue that created significant political division. 69 The
160. Id.
161. Id. at 623-24.
162. Indeed, some commentators believe that the political divisiveness test, while not ex-
plicitly stated, may have been the test underlying several decisions where statutes were found
to violate the establishment clause. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1058-60 (1986).
163. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
164. Id. at 798.
165. Id. at 794. The court appears to have heightened the scrutiny of the secular purpose
test, requiring that the "law in question,... must reflect a clearly... legislative purpose." I
at 773 (emphasis added). The insertion of the word "clearly" may be interpreted as lowering
the amount of deference required under Lemon when evaluating the legislature's stated intent.
166. Id. at 795-96.
167. Id. at 794.
168. "[C]ompetition among religious sects for political and religious supremacy has occa-
sioned considerable civil strife, 'generated in a large part' by competing efforts to gain or main-
tain the support of government." Id. at 796 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-
9 (1947)).
169. Id. at 797. The Court's holding indicates its realization of how sensitive issues involve
the establishment clause. While a spending bill may evoke passion, it seems illogical to assume
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Court held that the political divisiveness of a statute did not, without more,
violate the establishment clause; rather, political divisiveness raised a "warn-
ing signal."17
Without a clear majority, the status of the political divisiveness test re-
mained unclear. The independence of the political divisiveness test, how-
ever, is not crucial. Even if political divisiveness is viewed only as a
particular form of entanglement, and thus as subordinate to the entangle-
ment test, the Lemon decision indicates that a violation of the political divi-
siveness test still triggers the protection of the establishment clause, albeit
through the entanglement test. 171 Regardless, because the Court treated the
political divisiveness test in Lemon as "entanglement of yet a different char-
acter," '172 and in a subsequent case as an "addition," 173 political divisiveness
should be viewed as a separate test. As a separate test, its violation places a
heavy burden on the state instead of the conclusory presumption created by
a violation of any one of the three prongs of the Lemon test. 174
The courts have yet to develop fully the political divisiveness test,175 ap-
parently because the Court is comfortable with the three-prong Lemon
test. 176 The Lemon test has survived intact, and has subsequently been
strengthened, thus rebuilding Jefferson's damaged wall.
D. The Present Test:
The Expansion of Lemon and the Continuing Use of the
Historical Exemption
Since the Lemon test's inception, the Supreme Court has continuously en-
dorsed and upheld the test. The developments over the years since Lemon
that it involves deep personal beliefs. Once associated with the measure, however, the infusion
of religion moves the debate over a spending bill to a far more intense level.
170. "And while the prospect of such divisiveness may not alone warrant the invalidation
of state laws that otherwise survive the careful scrutiny required by the decisions of this Court,
it is certainly a 'warning signal' not to be ignored." Id. at 797-98 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971)).
171. If a statute, however, creates a political entanglement, but not an administrative en-
tanglement, it may not violate the establishment clause. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
372 (1975).
172. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
173. Meek, 421 U.S. at 372.
174. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L.
REV. 83, 141-42 (1986).
175. The Court did appear to use political divisiveness as an independent test in Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412-16 (1985).
176. See, e.g., Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1113, 1126-27 (1988); Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism ": Pro-
posed Standards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 333, 360-61.
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have been limited to fine tuning the Lemon test, not challenging it. In gen-
eral, the Court has aimed to strengthen the wall between church and state.
In Meek v. Pittenger,1 the Court, in a plurality opinion, held that ele-
ments of a Pennsylvania statute, allowing the direct loan of instructional
materials, equipment, and auxiliary service to parochial schools, violated the
establishment clause.17 Concurring in part, Justice Brennan, joined by Jus-
tices Douglas and Marshall, advocated the use of a heightened secular pur-
pose test and the independent political divisiveness test of Nyquist.17 9 In
analyzing the secular purpose, Justice Brennan wrote, "[t]he law in question
must, first, reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose."'18 More impor-
tantly, Justice Brennan's concurrence offered the strongest language yet in
support of an independent political divisiveness test. Specifically, Justice
Brennan stated that "the Court, albeit without express recognition of the
fact, added a significant fourth factor to the [Lemon] test... divisive polit-
ical potential." 181
Seven years later, the Court, in Larson v. Valente, 182 found that a Minne-
sota solicitation law, allowing a reporting exemption for religious organiza-
tions that received more than 50% of contributions from their members,
violated the establishment clause because the state designed the law to dis-
criminate against the Unification Church. 183 The Court held that the strict
scrutiny test applies whenever a state law demonstrates a denominational
bias.184 This was the first time the Court used strict scrutiny in an establish-
ment clause challenge, an important expansion beyond the deference granted
to legislators under the Lemon test.185
The Court examined legislative intent in Wallace v. Jaffree. 186 In Wal-
lace, the Court ruled that an Alabama school prayer and meditation statute
violated the establishment clause because the advancement of religion moti-
vated the lawmakers.187 The Court reasoned that when applying the Lemon
177. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
178. Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell held that a textbook loan program was con-
stitutional. But see Bower v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610-11 (1988) (holding that grants to
religious institutions under a facially neutral statute do not violate the establishment clause).
179. See supra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
180. 421 U.S. at 373.
181. Id. at 374 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622).
182. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
183. Id at 244-47.
184. Id. at 246.
185. Id; Note, Another Brick in the Wall- Denominational Preferences and Strict Scrutiny
Under Establishment Clause, 62 NEB. L. REV. 359, 361 (1983); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 613 (1971).
186. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
187. Id at 56, 59-60.
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test, "it is appropriate to ask 'whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion.' ,,""8 Also, for the first time since Nyquist,
five Justices accepted a "clear" secular purpose as the test for the first prong
of the Lemon test.'8 9 The trend toward more separation, led by the Lemon
test and its progeny, appeared to alarm advocates of a porous wall of separa-
tion. Justice Rehnquist, in a staunch dissent, called for the dismantling of
the Lemon test, saying that "the Lemon test has no more grounding in the
history of the First Amendment than does the wall theory upon which it
rests."' 19 The Court did not heed Justice Rehnquist's call. 9'
In School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 192 the Court analyzed the "ef-
fect" branch of the Lemon test. 193 The Michigan Community Education
and Shared Time programs provided supplementary classes to students in
private schools at public expense. 194 The Court found sectarian schools to
be the primary beneficiaries of the program.' 95 The Court noted that the
purpose of the statute was laudable: providing additional education for the
state's schoolchildren.'96 Despite the aim of the statute, the Court stated,
"[o]ur cases have consistently recognized that even such a praiseworthy, sec-
ular purpose cannot validate government aid to parochial schools when the
aid has the effect of promoting a single religion or religion generally or when
the aid unduly entangles the government in matters religious."' 97 The Court
proceeded to outline the three criteria used to evaluate a statute's effect: 1)
whether the statute encourages subtle or overt religious indoctrination; 2)
whether the statute creates a symbolic union between Church and State;
and, 3) whether the statute in effect subsidizes religious activity.' 9 The
Court applied these criteria and ruled that state funding of instructors in a
sectarian environment might subtly or overtly indoctrinate students in par-
ticular religious tenets; that inherent in the state support of instruction in
sectarian schools is the threat of conveying to the public a message of state
support for religion; and, finally, that the program acted as a direct subsidy
to parochial schools.' 99
188. Id. at 56 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
189. Id. at 56, 66.
190. Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 55-56.
192. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
193. Id. at 397.
194. Id. at 375.
195. Id.
196. Id at 382.
197. Id




The Court's final expansion of the Lemon criteria appeared in Edwards v.
Aguillard.c° In Aguillard, the Court held unconstitutional the Louisiana
Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public
Schools Instruction Act. Although case law regarding the establishment
clause generally discussed only broad concepts of religion, the Aguillard
Court went a step further, saying, "[a] governmental intention to promote
religion is clear when the State enacts a law to serve a religious purpose.
This intention may be evidenced by promotion of religion in general, or by
advancement of a particular religious belief."' '
Thus, the trend in establishment clause adjudication has been toward
widening the separation between church and state. There have been only a
few cases in which the Court rejected an establishment clause challenge.20 2
The Court decided these cases under the historical exemption proposed in
Walz v. Tax Commission of New York 2 ° In Lynch v. Donnelly,2" the Court
addressed whether state funded creches violated the establishment clause.
While the Court admitted that a creche is commonly associated with reli-
gion, it reasoned that because the creche was part of a "celebration acknowl-
edged in the Western World for 20 centuries,"205 the City of Pawtucket,
Rhode Island had not violated the establishment clause.2°
Additionally, in Marsh v. Chambers,2"7 the Court allowed the Nebraska
state legislature, using state tax dollars, to pay for a chaplain to open the
daily sessions with a prayer.20" In both Lynch and Marsh, the Court pointed
out that mixing religious and secular activities had been common in the
United States for over two hundred years, but the mix had not evidenced any
200. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
201. Id. at 585 (citations omitted). The particular religious belief that life begins at concep-
tion is the underlying rationale of the antiabortion movement. Infra note 346.
202. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983).
203. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
204. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
205. Id. at 686.
206. Id at 687. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, offered an alternative test to
Lemon endorsement. Justice O'Connor stated:
Our prior cases have used the three-part [Lemon test] as a guide to detecting...
forms of unconstitutional government action. It has never been entirely clear, how-
ever, how the three parts of the test relate to the principles enshrined in the Estab-
lishment Clause. Focusing on institutional entanglement and on endorsement or
disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device.
Id. at 688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (footnote and citation omitted).
207. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
208. Id. at 795.
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threat to secular institutions." 9 This history of coexistence, rather than
strict legal precedent, appears to be the touchstone in these cases.
The Court recently reexamined the historical exemption in a religious dis-
play setting in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.210
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor,
ruled that a creche with an angel wearing a banner stating "Glory to God in
the Highestl ' 211 violated the establishment clause.21 2 The Court distin-
guished Lynch by explaining that "Lynch teaches that government may cele-
brate Christmas in some manner and form, but not in a way that endorses
Christian doctrine. Here, Allegheny County has transgressed this line.",
213
Allegheny thus indicates that there are strict limitations on the use of histori-
cal arguments in establishment clause adjudication.
The importance of the Court's opinion in Allegheny also lies in Justice
O'Connor's decision to join the majority. Some commentators had viewed
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch 214 as a repudiation of the Lemon
test, rendering the Lemon test a minority stance.2'5 Justice O'Connor, how-
ever, joined Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in Part III
A of Allegheny to expressly uphold the three-pronged Lemon test.216 De-
spite Justice O'Connor's apparent wavering and the problems posed by his-
torical exemptions, the Lemon test has survived intact.
E. A Modern Day Test for Establishment Clause Adjudication
The modified Lemon test forms the crux of the present test for establish-
ment clause challenges. The test requires that a statute have a clearly secu-
lar purpose 2 17 which does not discriminate against a sect, 2 18 and does not
evidence a legislative intent to endorse religion or a particular religious be-
lief.219 In addition, the statute's primary effect must neither advance nor
inhibit religion, including a tacit or implicit endorsement of religion,220 and
209. Id.; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 686.
210. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
211. Id at 3103.
212. Id. at 3105.
213. Id.
214. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra
note 206.
215. Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: The Case for the Creche, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 459, 488
(1984).
216. "This trilogy of tests has been applied regularly in the Court's... decisions." Alle-
gheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3100.
217. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
218. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
219. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987).
220. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. at 3100-01 (1989).
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the statute must not entangle the Church and the State, even to the extent of
a small step in that direction.22 I Therefore, the Court can find unconstitu-
tional a statute that entangles the state in a political issue divided along reli-
gious lines.22 2 If a statute violates any of these rules, the Court will still
allow the statute to stand where the particular religious practice in question
has a long history of coexistence, without interference, with secular institu-
221tions. It is against this test that all establishment clause challenges must
be measured.
II. DOES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PROHIBIT THE OUTLAWING
OF ABORTION?
A. Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil:
The Court's Approach in Harris v. McRae
The Court addressed the relationship between antiabortion regulations
and the establishment clause only once, in Harris v. McRae. 224 The debate
in McRae focused on the Hyde amendment,225 which restricted the use of
federal funds for abortions.226 The day Congress enacted the Hyde amend-
ment, Cora McRae, a Medicaid recipient from New York in the first trimes-
ter of her pregnancy, sought to enjoin enforcement of the amendment in the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York.2 " The New York City
Health and Hospitals Corporation, which operated sixteen hospitals, twelve
of which performed abortions, joined McRae in the suit.221 Plaintiffs chal-
lenged the Hyde amendment, alleging violations of the first, fourth, fifth, and
221. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
222. Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973).
223. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).
224. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
225. Id. at 300-01.
226. [N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform
abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of
rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforce-
ment agency or public health service.
Id. at 302 (quoting Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979)). Limiting Medicaid fund-,
ing for abortions radically weakens women's access to abortion because prior to enactment of
the Hyde amendment three hundred thousand abortions, a third of all abortions performed in
the United States, were paid for by Medicaid. See TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABsO-
LUTES 151 (1990) (discussing the ban on Medicaid funding for abortions).
227. McRae, 448 U.S. at 303.
228. Id.
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ninth amendments.229 The district court certified the case as a class action
after granting the injunction.230
After a remand from the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the
injunction, the district court conducted a lengthy trial.23 ' The trial focused
on three major issues: 1) whether a state participating in the Medicaid pro-
gram was obligated to fund medically necessary abortions regardless of fed-
eral reimbursement; 2) whether the Hyde amendment violated the due
process clause; and, 3) whether the Hyde amendment violated the religion
clauses of the first amendment.232 The district court rejected plaintiff's ar-
gument that the state was required to continue payments for medically nec-
essary abortions because, in the court's view, the Hyde amendment had freed
the state of that burden.233 The district court also rejected plaintiff's estab-
lishment clause argument, claiming that the statute had a secular purpose,
neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and that it did not cause excessive
entanglement.234 The district court did, however, accept plaintiff's due pro-
cess and free exercise of religion claims.235
Noting probable jurisdiction, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.236
The Court agreed with the lower court's determination that, under the Hyde
amendment, New York was not required to pay for medically necessary
abortions, but used a different rationale.237 Having resolved the statutory
issue, the Court proceeded to examine the relevant constitutional issues.
The Court began by examining the claim that the Hyde amendment im-
pinged on the liberty interest protected by the due process clause as recog-
nized in Roe v. Wade.23 ' The Court rejected this argument. While
acknowledging that Roe did entitle a woman to the right to have access to an
abortion, the Court stated, "although government may not place obstacles in
the path of... [a woman's choice to have an abortion,] it need not remove
those [obstacles] not of its own creation. '239 Therefore, although indigent
status was likely to hinder a woman's ability to receive an abortion, govern-
229. Id.
230. Id. at 304. The class represented was "all pregnant or potentially pregnant women in
the State of New York eligible for Medicaid... who decide to have an abortion within the first
24 weeks of pregnancy, and ... all authorized providers of abortion services to such women."
Id.
231. For a full discussion of the prior history, see id. at 303-06.
232. Id. at 304-05.
233. Id. at 305.
234. Id. at 305 n.8.
235. Id at 305-06.
236. 444 U.S. 1069 (1980).
237. 448 U.S. at 308-11.
238. Id. at 312.
239. Id at 316.
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ment had no obligation to assist her in procuring an abortion because gov-
ernment had not impoverished the woman. 240
The Court then evaluated the argument that the Hyde amendment vio-
lated the first amendment's bar against establishing religion and impinging
upon the freedom of religion.241 The Court did not reach the merits of the
free exercise clause challenge, and dismissed it for a lack of standing.242
As for the establishment clause challenge, the Court, in a cursory fashion,
rejected a claim that the Hyde amendment, by incorporating doctrines of the
Roman Catholic Church into law, violated the establishment clause.24 3 Spe-
cifically, the Court stated that a statute does not "violate[] the Establish-
ment Clause because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of
some or all religions.' ,24 To illustrate its point, the Court reasoned "that
[although] the Judaeo-Christian religions oppose stealing [that] does not
mean that a State ... may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause,
enact laws prohibiting larceny." '245 This rationale, however, tended to indi-
cate the weakness of the Court's approach to this particular establishment
clause challenge. 24
First, because the challenge alleged a denominational basis, under Larson,
the Court should have utilized strict scrutiny.247 At a minimum, using
Lemon, the Court should have looked for a clearly secular purpose, asked
who received the primary benefit of limiting abortion funds, and examined
whether the Hyde amendment unnecessarily entangled church and state.248
The Court, in attempting to justify its failure to apply the Lemon test, stated
that "the fact that the funding restrictions in the Hyde Amendment may
coincide with the religious tenets does not, without more, contravene the
240. Id. at 316-17.
241. Id. at 318-19.
242. Id. at 320.
243. Id. at 319.
244. Id.
245. Id
246. While the Court equates larceny statutes and the Hyde amendment, analysis under
the Lemon test, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), illustrates that these two
types of law are distinguishable. Larceny statutes can clearly withstand establishment clause
analysis. First, the state acts in accordance with a clearly secular purpose when it attempts to
protect its citizens' property interests. The primary effect is beneficial to all citizens, not to
particular religious groups. Also, such legislation does not involve the government in a polit-
ical debate divided along religious lines. Supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
The Hyde amendment cannot withstand this same type of analysis. See infra notes 248-51
and accompanying text.
247. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-47 (1982); see also supra notes 182-85 and ac-
companying text.
248. See Comment, The Establishment Clause and Religious Influences on Legislation, 75
Nw. U.L. REv. 944 (1980).
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Establishment Clause. 249 The logical question to be asked was what
"more" did the Court require. It appears from the Court's language that a
successful establishment clause challenge would have to demonstrate that
the statute did more than "coincide or harmonize" with religious tenets.
Ironically, the district court in McRae found more:
[T]he record indicates, only the Roman Catholic Church, among
the institutional religions, has sought to secure the enactment of
legislation that would forbid abortion, has organized educational
and lobbying efforts to that end, and acted to mobilize popular sup-
port for its legislative goals.... [T]hat the efforts of the Roman
Catholic clergy and laity have produced the [Hyde amendment is
not a fact], but it is more likely than not that those efforts have
been a factor that cannot be eliminated from the chain of
causation.25o
The Church's active role in the creation of the Hyde amendment indicates
that the statute's similarity to the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic
Church was more than mere coincidence.
B. Completing the Task of Harris v. McRae:
Why Present Antiabortion Statutes Cannot Survive a Thorough
Establishment Clause Analysis
1. States Do Not Have a Clearly Secular Purpose on Which to Base
Antiabortion Statutes
Decisions such as Edwards v. Aguillard and Wallace v. Jaffree indicate the
willingness of the Court to question the motives of state legislators. As the
Lemon Court indicated, the Court will allow a statute to stand only if "we
find nothing... that undermines the stated legislative intent." '251 According
to the Aguillard Court, if the actual intention of the legislature is to promote
religion, the claimed secular purpose is undermined and will be disregarded
by the Court.252 An intention to promote religion may be "evidenced by
promotion of religion in general... or by advancement of a particular reli-
gious belief."' 253 Even if there is some valid, secular purpose, under Lynch,
the "requirement [of a secular purpose] is not satisfied... by the mere exist-
ence of some secular purpose, however dominated by religious purposes. 254
249. Harris, 448 U.S. at 319-20.
250. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
251. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
252. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593-94 (1987). In Aguillard, the state's claim
that their plan for balanced treatment of creation and science protected academic freedom was
undermined by the Court's determination that the actual purpose was to promote religion.
253. Id. at 585 (citations omitted).
254. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984).
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As the Aguillard Court indicated, while "the Court is normally deferential to
a State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of
such purpose be sincere and not a sham." '255 The secular purpose of an-
tiabortion legislation must be measured against this framework.
In the context of abortion, the issue of secular purpose turns on one cen-
tral issue: Whether a fetus is a human life.256 Undoubtedly, if a fetus is a
human life, a state would have a secular interest in protecting that life, and
any action taken to protect that life would pass the first prong of the Lemon
test. Often, however, the individual legislator's method of defining life can
invoke the need for establishment clause analysis.257 If the definition of life
is motivated by religious beliefs, and incorporated into law, the resulting law
cannot withstand establishment clause examination.25 8
Arguably, however, a state could pass such regulations based solely on a
secular belief that life begins at conception. While some medical opinions
appear contrary to this proposition,259 the question of whether a state can
pass antiabortion laws based on a purely secular belief merits examination.
In enacting the regulation, the state would attempt to maximize the preser-
vation of fetal life. Regulations based on secular beliefs would likely be evi-
denced by the existence of legal protections for state citizens in all
substantive areas of state law from the moment of conception. Alternatively,
if the view that life begins at conception is confined exclusively to abortion
regulation, the absence of such a consistent legislative scheme would tend to
undermine a claim that the legislature's intent in enacting an antiabortion
regulation was clearly secular.
For example, four states have antiabortion regulations that tacitly or im-
plicitly reflect a desire to protect life from the moment of conception: Ken-
tucky, 2' 6 Nebraska,261 Pennsylvania262 and Missouri.263 If a state has based
255. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 586-87.
256. "If it is not a human life, we have no fight, we have no argument. If it is a human life,
then we do have a lot to argue about." 125 CONG. REc. 17,020 (1979) (comments of Rep.
Henry Hyde on a proposal to revoke the Hyde amendment, which limited Medicaid funding
for abortions).
257. "We cannot allow our government to become involved in this inhumane treatment of
human life. It is God's creation and it is imperative that we do not destroy it." Id. (comments
of Rep. Bouquard in support of Hyde amendment).
258. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
585 (1987).
259. See Gardner, Is An Embryo A Person, THE NATION, Nov. 13, 1989, at 557.
260. "If, however, the United States Constitution is amended or relevant judicial decisions
are reversed or modified, the declared policy of this Commonwealth to recognize and to pro-
tect the lives of all human beings regardless of their degree of biological development shall be
fully restored." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.710 (Baldwin 1988).
261. The Legislature hereby finds and declares:
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its laws on a secular belief that life begins at conception, then comparing the
state antiabortion statutes to the state's homicide and wrongful death stat-
utes should indicate the presence of an internal consistency indicative of a
statutory scheme designed to protect a secularly based definition of life as
beginning at conception. In such a system, the fetus, from the moment of
conception, would be protected by state law. If the fetus were murdered, its
killer could be prosecuted for homicide. 2 " If the fetus died as the result of
another's negligent act, the relatives of the fetus could sue the negligent
party under the state's wrongful death statute.265 Thus, this system, based
on a secular belief that life begins at conception, would not only protect,
within constitutional limits, the fetus from being aborted, but would also
(1) That the following provisions were motivated by the legislative intrusion of the
United States Supreme Court by virtue of its decision removing the protection af-
forded the unborn....
(2) That the members of the Legislature expressly deplore the destruction of the
unborn human lives which has and will occur in Nebraska as a consequence of the
United States Supreme Court's decision on abortion of January 22, 1973 ....
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-325 (1977).
262. (c) Construction.-In every relevant civil or criminal proceeding in which it is
possible to do so without violating the Federal Constitution, the common and statu-
tory law of Pennsylvania shall be construed so as to extend to the unborn the equal
protection of the laws and to further the public policy of this Commonwealth encour-
aging childbirth over abortion.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3202 (1989). "'Unborn child' and 'fetus.' Each term shall mean an
individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth." 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3203 (Supp. 1989).
263. 1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and con-
strued to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development,
all the rights privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and resi-
dents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States....
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.1-2 (Vernon 1986).
264. Consider, for example, the case in Boston, Massachusetts, where Charles Stuart, with
the assistance of his brother, allegedly shot and killed his wife who was seven months preg-
nant. The eight week premature infant was delivered alive, but died shortly thereafter. A
Murderous Hoax, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1990 at 16.
Under the present laws of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, and Missouri, if the unborn
fetus was not born alive, the state could not have prosecuted Charles Stuart's accomplices for
the murder of Stuart's unborn son. In a state with a secular policy favoring life from the
moment of conception, the state homicide statute would be drafted, or in the alternative, inter-
preted, to allow the killer of any fetus, from the moment of conception, to be prosecuted for
homicide. See infra notes 321-24 and accompanying text.
265. A common factual situation in this area is the miscarriage of a nonviable or viable
fetus as a result of the mother's involvement in a car accident. See, e.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf
Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974) (holding that mother of a viable fetus, stillborn as a
result of injuries received within the womb, is entitled to sue the officer who caused the acci-
dent which led to prenatal injuries).
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extend to the fetus the full protection of all state laws, including protection
under the state's wrongful death and homicide laws.26 6 Absent such a con-
sistent scheme, however, the actual intention of the legislature is suspect,
and may be exposed as promoting a particular religious belief, thereby un-
dermining the claimed secular purpose and offending the establishment
clause.
a. Kentucky
Kentucky abortion laws indicate that the Commonwealth's intention is to
protect human embryos "regardless of their degree of biological develop-
ment.",267 Kentucky's homicide and wrongful death statutes, however, do
not reflect this concern. While the Kentucky Criminal Homicide Statute
268
says only that "a person is guilty of criminal homicide when he causes the
death of another human being,",269 the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that
to be considered a human being under the statute, one must be born alive.
270
Similarly, the Kentucky Wrongful Death Act2 71 refers to accountability
arising when "the death of a person results from an injury infficted by the
negligence or wrongful act of another., 272 Again, the Kentucky Supreme
Court was left to interpret the meaning of the word "person." In Mitchell v.
Couch, 273 the court considered whether the mother of a stillborn infant, al-
legedly born dead as the result of prenatal injuries, could sue under the
wrongful death statute. The court cautioned:
It should be pointed out that there is a definite medical distinction
between the term "embryo" and the phrase "viable fetus." The
embryo is the fetus in its earliest stages of development, but the
expression "viable fetus" means the child has reached such a state
of development that it can presently live outside the female body as
well as within it.
27 4
Denying the plaintiff's claim, the court concluded that "when a pregnant
woman is injured through negligence and the child, if it be a viable infant
within the definition recited above, [is injured] a right of recovery exists. ,275
266. For an explanation of the Tennessee model which achieves this internal parity, see
infra notes 319-28 and accompanying text.
267. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.710(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988).
268. Id. § 507.
269. Id. § 507.10.
270. Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983).
271. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.130 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1970).
272. Id. § 411.130(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1970).
273. 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955).
274. Id. at 905.
275. Id. at 906 (emphasis added).
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Despite the Kentucky legislature's stated intention to "protect the lives of
all human beings regardless of their degree of biological development,"276
the laws of the state of Kentucky reflect this intention only in the area of
abortion. 277 Kentucky's inconsistent protections for the unborn, however,
appear to be the rule, not the exception.278
b. Nebraska
The Nebraska state legislature has indicated its sense of frustration with
the United States Supreme Court's abortion rulings, stating, "[t]he members
of the Legislature expressly deplore the destruction of the unborn human
lives which has and will occur in Nebraska as a consequence of the United
States Supreme Court's decision on abortion [in Roe v. Wade]."'279
Unlike Kentucky, the state of Nebraska left little doubt as to whom it
intended to protect from homicide. The Nebraska statute specifically states
that a "[p]erson, when referring to the victim of a homicide, shall mean a
human being who had been born and was alive at the time of the homicidal
act."28
0
Unlike in their homicide statute, however, the Nebraska legislature failed
to define the term "person" in their wrongful death statute.281 In 1951, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 2 2 ruled that be-
cause at common law there was no recovery for stillborn infants, a similar
bar applied to the state's former wrongful death statute.283 Following the
Drabbels decision, the legislature enacted the existing wrongful death
statute.
The new wrongful death statute was examined in Egbert v. Wenzl. 2" The
plaintiff, alleging her viable fetus was stillborn as a result of prenatal injuries
proximately caused by defendant, requested the court to overrule Drabbels
and rule that the Nebraska wrongful death statute's definition of a "person"
276. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.710(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988).
277. Both incidents requiring the Kentucky Supreme Court to interpret the meaning of
"person" and "human being" were necessitated by the vagueness of the statute's wording.
Had the legislature intended to protect life from the moment of conception they could have
redrafted the statute to reflect this concern. The legislature's failure to do so raises questions
as to how broad their desire was to protect all stages of human development.
278. See infra notes 279-300 and accompanying text.
279. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-325(2) (1977); see supra note 261.
280. Id. § 28-302(2).
281. Id. § 30-809. "Action for wrongful death; creation. Whenever the death of a person
shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default, of any person [a cause of action arises]
282. 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
283. Id.
284. 199 Neb. 573, 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977).
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went beyond the common law definition28 to include a viable infant. Ruling
for the defendant, the court said,
In view of the common law rule that an unborn fetus was not a
person insofar as the law of torts is concerned, we think that if
there had been an intention to create an action for the wrongful
death of a viable fetus it would have been specifically so stated by
the Legislature when the wrongful death statute was enacted.
286
Thus, the protection afforded the unborn in Nebraska wrongful death ac-
tions was even lower than that afforded in similar cases in Kentucky, requir-
ing not only viability, but live birth. Despite its frustration that it was
barred from protecting the unborn, the Nebraska legislature not only explic-
itly excluded the unborn from its homicide statute, but similarly acquiesced
in the court's requirement that a child be born alive to receive protection
under the wrongful death statute.
c. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's legislature has sought to extend to the unborn the equal
protection of the common and statutory law of the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania.287 The unborn are defined as "organism[s] of the species homo
sapiens from fertilization until live birth."
288
Like Kentucky, Pennsylvania's homicide statute does not define the term
"human being.",289 As in Kentucky, however, the term "human being" has
been construed by the Pennsylvania courts to mean a person who is born
alive. 29
Pennsylvania's wrongful death act is also vague, 29 ' as are judicial interpre-
tations of the statute. Initially, in Scott v. Kopp,292 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania followed the common law rule requiring birth before a wrong-
ful death action could arise.2 93 In Amadio v. Levin, 94 however, the Supreme
285. At common law, a child had to be born alive in order to claim any damages as a result
of prenatal injuries. Id. at 574, 260 N.W.2d at 481-82.
286. Id. at 576, 260 N.W.2d at 482.
287. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3202 (1989).
288. Id. § 3203.
289. "(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being." 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2501 (1972). According to the corresponding historical note, Pennsylvania's homicide
statute is taken from the Model Penal Code which defines a human being as "a person who has
been born and is alive." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0 (1).
290. Pennsylvania Comm. v. Brown, 6 D.&C.3d 627 (1978).
291. "(a) General rule.-An action may be brought to recover damages for the death of an
individual caused by the wrongful act ... of another." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8301.
292. 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981).
293. Id. at 489, 431 A.2d at 960.
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Court of Pennsylvania overruled Kopp,295 concluding that "[t]he time has
arrived... [to] recognize that survival and wrongful death actions lie by the
estates of stillborn children for fatal injuries they received while viable chil-
dren en ventre sa mere."296 In dicta, the court indicated that it may have
intended protection to extend beyond viability.297 Concurring and casting
the deciding vote, Justice Zappala of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court lim-
ited the scope of his agreement, stating, "[b]ecause the Complaint in this
case asserts that [the stillborn child] was 'viable' at the time of the allegedly
negligent conduct of the defendants caused her death, the questions involved
in circumstances implicating 'viability' in other ways must be left for another
day." 298
While the parameters of the court's decisions are debatable, the actions of
the legislature are clear. Following the Kopp decision, legislation was intro-
duced to allow a stillborn fetus to bring a cause of action. This legislation,
however, was not reported out of committee. 299 While the Pennsylvania leg-
islature has passed abortion regulations stating it wishes to "extend to the
unborn the equal protection of the laws," 3" it has failed to legislatively ef-
fectuate that desire in the areas of criminal homicide and wrongful death
actions.
d. Missouri
The status of the unborn in Missouri is unclear, in part because Missouri's
statement that life begins at conception and that all laws shall be interpreted
so as to extend to the unborn rights of other citizens has not faced a chal-
lenge in the setting of a homicide or a wrongful death action. Additionally,
Missouri's current homicide statute does not define the term "person.,
30 1
Also, thus far, no Missouri court has ruled on the definition of "person" as
used in the statute.30 2 The general rule regarding whether a person must be
born alive in order to be considered a homicide victim, however, is "at com-
mon law, and except as the statutes may otherwise provide, it is necessary
294. 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d at 1085 (1985).
295. Id. at 208, 501 A.2d at 1089.
296. Id. at 203, 501 A.2d at 1086-87.
297. Id at 204, 501 A.2d at 1087.
298. Id. at 230 n.7, 501 A.2d at 1101 n.7 (Zappala, J., concurring).
299. Id. at 233-35, 501 A.2d at 1103 (Nix, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Nix's dissent
focused on the failure of the legislature to pass this bill, arguing that the action of the court, in
light of the legislature's actions, "entered the realm of statute-making, a function long recog-
nized not to be performed by this Court." Id.
300. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3202(c) (Purdon 1983).




that the child be fully born."3 ° The current homicide statute does not, on
its face, appear to challenge the common law rule.
Missouri's wrongful death statute, allowing an individual to sue for the
wrongful death of another "person," also lacks a definition of the word "per-
son. '' " The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the wrongful death
statute "does provide a cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable
fetus."3 5 The court, however, explicitly limited the scope of its ruling, re-
serving the right to deal with application of the wrongful death statutes to
nonviable fetuses.3 "6
Missouri's new antiabortion statute,3 "7 which extends all rights granted to
other persons to an unborn child at any stage of development, purports to
define the term "person" for all statutes.30 If this statute does define "per-
son" uniformly for all state statutes, Missouri will have created an internally
consistent set of laws defining when life begins. This provision, however,
remains untested. Early challenges indicate that the provision may not be
uniformly applied. For example, Missouri has refused to allow a mother to
take a tax deduction for her fetus, and has refused a claim that pregnant
women cannot be incarcerated because their fetuses are imprisoned in viola-
tion of the thirteenth amendment.3a° Missouri has also denied the defense of
necessity to charges of trespassing in an abortion clinic. a 0 Missouri may,
303. 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 2(b) (1944).
304. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (Vernon 1988).
305. O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 911 (Mo. 1983).
306. Id. at 911.
307. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205 (1986).
308. 1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and con-
strued to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development,
all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and resi-
dents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States....
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1-.2 (1990).
309. See generally Saletan, If fetuses are people ... reductio ad absurdum in Missouri,"
abortion legislation, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 18, 1989, at 18 (the article outlines early court
challenges resulting from Missouri's conclusion that life begins at conception. These chal-
lenges include questions regarding entitlements to driver's licenses, drinking, voting, admit-
tance to x-rated movies, and mandatory retirement.).
310. State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). The basis of the court's deci-
sion was that § 1.205 R.S.Mo.(1986) subjected itself to the U.S. Constitution, and thus a de-
fense of necessity was unavailable because the harm sought to be avoided (abortion) was
constitutionally protected. Id. at 192. This raises the issue as to whether § 1.205, subject to
the Constitution, can define human life beyond the language of the fourteenth amendment,
which defines citizens as those "born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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through subsequent decisions, demonstrate that the state's view of when life
begins, contained in its antiabortion statute,311 is applied uniformly.
It is clear, however, that the antiabortion, homicide and wrongful death
statutes in Kentucky, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania contain serious internal
inconsistencies. The existence of these inconsistencies evidences the applica-
tion of a diffrent standard regarding the definition of life in statutes regulat-
ing abortion. Because religious beliefs play such a significant role in
determining one's view of when life begins, and religious institutions have
taken such an active role in advocating statutes that regulate abortions based
on the belief that life begins at conception, the mere presence of these incon-
sistencies should trigger judicial inquiry as to whether the law is motivated
by a desire to promote religious views. If the law is motivated by the legisla-
tor's religious purposes, the statute violates the establishment clause.312
Inquiry should not cease upon detecting a potentially consistent statutory
scheme, however. Even if the statute's view of when life begins is uniformly
applied throughout its statutory scheme, other factors may undermine the
stated legislative intent. For example, chief among these factors for Mis-
souri's antiabortion bill, is that the bill was written in part by the Missouri
Catholic Conference. 313 Moreover, other evidence may be offered which
tends to undermine the legislature's stated intent.31 4 For example, such may
be the case when the stated legislative intent of abortion regulation is to
protect the health of pregnant women,31 5 to protect the health of pregnant
311. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1990).
312. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
313. See Brief of Americans United For Separation Of Church And State as Amicus Curiae
in support of Appellees at 6-7, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989)
(No. 88-605). While religious groups are, and should be, permitted to participate in the legisla-
tive process, when a religious group writes legislation, passed nearly verbatim, the legislature
should take great pains to examine the legislation to be sure it meets the Lemon criteria, for
this type of legislation may contain or be motivated by religious sentiments.
314. Infra notes 315-17 and accompanying text. Generally, a discrepancy between stated
legislative intent and fact may form the basis for a due process challenge. Such challenges are
limited by the deference granted by the court to state legislatures. Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) ("But the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its
aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." Id.
at 487-88.). A challenge brought under the establishment clause, however, would not be so
limited because of the court's willingness, as stated in Nyquist, Aguillard, and Jaffree, to ex-
amine the nature and intent of state legislatures.
315. "(b) The legislature finds as fact that: ... (2) the medical, emotional and psychological
consequences of abortion are serious and can be lasting, particularly when the patient is imma-
ture .... Ala. Code § 26-21-1 (1990). But cf Brief of Amicus Curiae American Pub. Health
Ass'n, at 11, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605).
According to the American Public Health Association (a group consisting of over 50,000 pa-
tients, physicians, and health professionals), a woman who carries a child to full term is sixteen
1226 [Vol. 39:1191
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316teenagers in connection with parental consent statutes, or to increase pop-
ulation levels.3 17 In addition, there are other situations where very few infer-
ences need be made to demonstrate religious intent.31
times more likely to die than a woman receiving a legal abortion. Thirty percent of women
carrying a pregnancy to full term experience major medical problems. Id. at 11-12. Also,
20% of all pregnancies require the major surgical procedure of a cesarean section, thus expos-
ing the woman to the additional risks accompanying major surgery. Id. at 12. Only 0.2%-
0.7% of women who have legal abortions experience any complications. Id. at 14; see also
Brief of The American Medical Ass'n as Anicus Curiae at 9-10, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605). The American Medical Association (over
280,000 physicians) supports the comparative figures and believes they are even higher, saying
"[t]he reported mortality figures may understate the relative safety of abortion compared to
childbirth. According to a number of studies, mortality statistics published by the federal
government underestimate the number of maternal deaths from childbirth by as much as 37%-
50%." Id The American Medical Association also points out that there is no evidence that
having an abortion creates any significant mental problems. Id. at 20-22. What evidence they
do have indicates that women who have abortions are less likely to experience psychiatric
disability than women who want, but are denied, abortions. Id. at 22. But see DAUGHTERS OF
ST. PAUL, PRO-LIFE CATECHISM 18 (1984) (claiming that abortion causes significant mental
problems for the mother).
316. The legislature finds that immature minors often lack the ability to make fully
informed choices that take into account both immediate and long-range conse-
quences of their actions; that the medical, emotional and psychological consequences
of abortion are serious and of indeterminate duration, particularly when the patient
is immature ....
W. Va. Code § 16-2F-1 (1990). But cf Brief Amicus Curiae In Support of Appellees By
Center for Population Options, et al. at 2-3, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct.
3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) (stating that the health problems associated with pregnancies for
older women increase when the pregnancy involves a teen. The one million teens who became
pregnant in 1983, 29,000 of whom were 14 or under, were 24% more likely to die from carry-
ing a pregnancy to term than having a first trimester abortion).
317. Such a proposition implies that the state has an interest in increased population. One
possible argument is that an expanding economy creates a labor shortage. Studies, however,
indicate that there is no such shortage occurring in the foreseeable future. Mandel, Plenty of
Workers are Waiting in the Wings, Bus. WK., Mar. 13, 1989, at 90-98. Also, presently no war,
famine, or disease threatens population to a point requiring population increases. Justice Ste-
vens noted the lack of such a secular purpose, stating that "[t]here have been times in history
when military and economic interests would have been served by an increase in population
.... [however], [n]o one argues today [that a state] can assert a societal interest in increasing
its population as its secular reason for fostering potential life." Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3084
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
318. From the Boston Globe:
Rep. Robert Dornan (R-Calif.) stood up on the House floor last week and told all his
fellow Catholic members of Congress that the pope wanted them to vote against
Medicaid financing of abortions for victims of rape and incest.
Dornan was so, excited that his thoughts tumbled out. "The Holy Father is a
father in Rome, as is Mother Teresa, fighting for her earthly life at this moment ....
The pope had a Mass on his lawn and he said, "stand up for life."
In Dornan's view, the church-or maybe just Dornan-has a right to demand a
"catholic loyal vote, like all loyal ethnic groups."
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e. Tennessee: A Model State Using Viability to Achieve its Secular
Interest in Protecting Unborn Human Life
In sharp contrast to the inconsistent statutory schemes of Kentucky, Ne-
braska, Pennsylvania, and Missouri,319 which apply a definition of life as
beginning at conception exclusively to antiabortion statutes, Tennessee's leg-
islation creates a consistent legislative scheme designed to protect unborn
human life that has reached the point of viability.32°
Under Tennessee's homicide statute,321 first degree murder is the "inten-
tional, premeditated and deliberate killing of another. '3 22 By statute, "[flor
purposes of [Tennessee's homicide statute] 'another' and 'another person'
include a viable fetus of a human being. 323
Tennessee's wrongful death statute also focuses on viability. In a series of
wrongful death actions,324 Tennessee courts followed the common law rule,
allowing a wrongful death action to arise only if the child was born alive. In
response to this series of cases, Tennessee amended its wrongful death stat-
ute to include "a fetus which was viable at the time of injury. A fetus shall
be considered viable if it had achieved a stage of development wherein it
could reasonably be expected to be capable of living outside the uterus. ' 32
Consistent with its homicide and wrongful death statutes, Tennessee fo-
cused on viability in its abortion regulation. 26 Under the Tennessee statute
after the point of viability has been reached, an abortion may only be per-
formed to preserve the life of the mother.327
Boston Globe, Nov. 2, 1989, at 21, col 1.
319. See supra notes 267-311 and accompanying text.
320. See infra notes 321-28 and accompanying text. This Comment offers Tennessee's stat-
utory scheme only as an example of a consistent and secularly supportable legislative program,
and does not take a position on the content of Tennessee's abortion regulations, particularly as
they relate to parental consent, waiting periods, and requirements imposed on the physician
when consulting with a patient regarding an abortion.
321. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-201 (Supp. 1990).
322. Id. § 39-13-202.
323. Id. § 39-13-214.
324. Hamby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1977); Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614,
371 S.W.2d 433 (1963); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358
S.W.2d 471 (1962); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
325. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106(b) (1980).
326. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-201(c)(1)(2) (1982). During the first three months of preg-
nancy, any woman may, after consultation with her attending physician, have an abortion. In
the period following the first trimester but prior to viability, any woman may have an abortion,
but it must be performed in an approved medical facility. This final requirement is commensu-
rate with Tennessee's requirement that, should a fetus, previously believed to be nonviable, be
born alive, the doctor must take all steps necessary to save the life of that fetus. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-15-202(c)(l)-(3) (Supp. 1990).
327. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(c)(3) (Supp. 1990).
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Thus Tennessee, unlike Nebraska, Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Missouri,
has enacted a legislative scheme which uniformly applies legal protections to
the viable fetus. The presence of a consistent statutory scheme, focusing on
viability, makes Tennessee's abortion laws less suspect under the establish-
ment clause. Unlike statutes focusing on a religious belief that life begins at
conception, viability presents the state with a secular, rather than a religious
or philosophical foundation upon which to base its laws. This secular basis
arises because being viable "means the child has reached such a state of de-
velopment that it can presently live outside the female body as well as within
it."' 328 It is the ability to survive outside the womb that separates the life of
the fetus from the life of the mother. As an independent life comes into
being, at the point of viability, the state exercises its secular duty to protect
human life. This is not the case when laws are based on the belief that life
begins at conception; prior to viability, there is not an identifiable secularly
defined individual life, only the potential for life. 329 Without such a secular
basis, these statutes cannot withstand sincere constitutional analysis using
the establishment clause.
In dismissing the claim of an establishment clause violation in McRae, the
Court stated that the fact that a statute "may coincide with the religious
tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not, without more, contravene the
Establishment Clause.",331 Presumably, internal statutory inconsistencies,
statutes written by religious groups, and questionable secular relation-
ships33' could add up to "more" in the eyes of the Court.
328. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky. 1955).
329. In his dissent to the plurality opinion of the Webster court, Justice Blackmun re-
sponded to the plurality's claim that "the State's interest in potential life is compelling
throughout pregnancy, not merely after viability" by stating:
In answering the plurality's claim that the State's interest in the fetus is uniform
and compelling throughout pregnancy, I cannot improve upon what JUSTICE STE-
VENS has written:
... the assertion that the government's interest is static simply ignores this
reality ... [U]nless the religious view that a fetus is a 'person' is adopted...
there is a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a
human being .... Recognition of this distinction is supported not only by logic,
but also by history and by our shared experiences.
... The viability line reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal develop-
ment; it marks that threshold moment prior to which a fetus cannot survive
separate from the woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as
a subject of rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of the preg-
nant woman.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3075 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 778-79 (1986)).
330. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added).
331. See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
1990] 1229
Catholic University Law Review
2. Antiabortion Statutes Have the Primary Effect of Benefiting Religion
To coexist with the establishment clause, a statute must not have the pri-
mary effect of aiding or advancing religion.-32 When examining primary
effect, the Court looks to whether the statute encourages subtle or overt in-
doctrination, creates a symbolic union between church and state, or has the
effect of subsidizing religion. 33' Despite state claims, advocates do not all
agree that women benefit from antiabortion statutes.3a 4 Indeed, because
such statutes legitimize the denomination's perspective that life begins at
conception, 335 in some cases it would appear that the primary, if not only,
beneficiaries of antiabortion statutes are religious denominations which op-
pose abortion.33 6
Additionally, it appears that the benefit conferred upon religious groups
which oppose abortion amounts to a violation of the second prong of the
Lemon test as defined in Engel, Ball, and Aguillard. First, antiabortion stat-
utes based on religious beliefs can be interpreted to encourage indoctrination
into religious denominations. As the Court indicated in Engel, when a state
embodies a religious tenet in its laws, religious minorities are coerced into
conformity.3 37 Subtle indoctrination occurs where a state, in adopting an
antiabortion statute, is in effect endorsing that tenet and its denominational
supporter.3 3 s This is particularly true in the highly charged atmosphere sur-
rounding the abortion controversy, where religious organizations have a visi-
ble role in attempting to get antiabortion legislation passed.33 9
Second, when a state incorporates a religious tenet into its law, a symbolic
union is created between church and state. This union is particularly evident
in situations where a religious group actively participates in writing an an-
332. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
333. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985).
334. See supra notes 315-16.
335. See DAUGHTERS OF ST. PAUL, supra note 315.
336. Although not the only denomination active in the antiabortion movement, the Roman
Catholic Church, as a result of its active role in advocating abortion regulation, is an obvious
beneficiary. Following the Court's decision in Roe, the Catholic Church, in 1973 alone, spent
four million dollars on lobbying Congress with regard to antiabortion issues, and that figure
does not include the amount of money spent at the state level. TRIBE, supra note 226, at 145.
In fact, some commentators maintain that the Catholic Church, in the years following Roe,
controlled most antiabortion institutions. Id. at 145-46. This belief is bolstered by a comment
of the National Right to Life Committee's executive director, who stated, "[t]he only reason
we have a pro-life movement in this country is because of the Catholic people and the Catholic
Church." Id at 146.
337. See supra note 73.
338. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985).
339. See supra note 336.
1230 [Vol. 39:1191
Comment
tiabortion statute which is subsequently made into law. 3' ° The result of this
participation is a union between church and state, as well as the "advance-
ment of a particular religious belief."' 34 1 Such state advocation of religious
doctrine is patently impermissible under the establishment clause.3 42
3. Antiabortion Statutes Entangle Church And State
Under Lemon, the Court determines excessive entanglement by examining
the organizations that are benefited, the type of state support, and the result-
ing relationship between church and state.343 The major force behind the
antiabortion movement is a large and well organized group of religious orga-
nizations.3' The goal of these groups is to outlaw abortion, which they
perceive as the taking of a life; their beliefs define life as beginning at concep-
tion.345 The nature of the aid conferred upon these religious groups when a
state adopts its views is without doubt "a fusion of governmental and reli-
gious functions. '31 Such a fusion places the police power of the state in a
supporting role for the enforcement of religious ideals. 347 Additionally, be-
cause religious diversity on the issue of abortion seems, at times, limitless,348
antiabortion regulations can create a "selective legislative imposition of bur-
dens and advantages upon particular denominations., 349  Active involve-
340. See Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State at 6-7, Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605).
341. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987).
342. Id.
343. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
344. See PAIGE, THE RIGHT TO LItERs (1983). Religious groups involved in the antiabor-
tion movement include: Catholics United for Life, National Organization of Episcopalians for
Life, American Baptist Friends of Life, Baptists for Life, Southern Baptists for Life, Lutherans
for Life, Moravians for Life, United Church of Christ Friends for Life, Task Force of United
Methodists on Abortion and Sexuality, Christian Action Council. See Brief of Catholics
United for Life Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605);
Christian Advocates Serving Evangelism, Brief of Christian Advocates Serving Evangelism,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605). Other religious
groups include the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, The Christian Life Commission of the
Southern Baptist Convention, and The National Ass'n of Evangelicals. See Brief for The Lu-
theran Church Synod Missouri, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989)
(No. 88-605).
345. See, e.g., V. DILLION, IN DEFENSE OF LIFE 5-6 (1971); see also A. MERTON, ENE-
MIES OF CHOICE 1-2 (1981).
346. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
347. Such a relationship appears obvious when a state arrests, tries, convicts, and imprisons
an individual for performing an abortion under a statute which is religiously based.
348. Compare Brief Amicus Curiae for Catholics for a Free Choice, Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605) (favoring a woman's right to an abor-
tion) with Brief Amicus Curiae for Catholics United for Life, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (opposing a woman's right to an abortion).
349. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254 (1982) (emphasis in original).
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ment of the state in legitimizing particular religious views is clearly one of
the primary evils which the Framers of the establishment clause sought to
avoid.350
Finally, by basing its laws on religious views, the state is subjugated to
those views, which are constantly changing.35' Moreover, the state becomes
the protector of the denomination's stance on life, thus creating "a concert
or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of the
State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of
all orthodoxies." '352 Such a dependency of churches upon the state threatens
"wholesome" neutrality, the intended guarantee of the establishment
clause.
4. Antiabortion Statutes Involve the State in a Political Issue Which is
Divided Along Religious Lines
Throughout its history, religious diversity has been an attribute of Ameri-
can society.354 Such diversity appears to preclude a unanimous sectarian
view of when life begins.355 It is within and across denominational lines that
the dispute regarding the beginning of life has centered.3 56 The resulting
battle over when life begins can thus be cast as an ecclesiastical dispute. In
Lemon, the court warned of such a dispute. After pointing out that legisla-
tors faced with issues implicating religion will often "find their votes aligned
with their faith," '35 7 the Lemon Court warned that while ordinarily vigorous
political debate is a sign of a healthy democracy, "political division along
religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amend-
ment was intended to protect. '' 358 The goal of the anti-abortion movement
has been to gain the support of government officials to enforce its view of
350. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 620 (1971).
351. See Brief for Catholics for a Free Choice at 5-6, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605).
352. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
353. Id.
354. See generally Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1947) (outlining religious
strife in the colonies).
355. Brief Amicus Curiae for American Jewish Congress at 11-17, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605). Views regarding abortion defy unanimity,
even within sects. While many Roman Catholics reject abortion, some allow it under certain
circumstances. Baptists generally consider their opposition to abortion as non-binding. The
Episcopal Church continues to support a woman's right to have an abortion, as do the
Presbyterians, who focus on viability. Many Protestant theologians maintain that life does not
begin at conception, as do many Jewish groups. Id.
356. See supra notes 345, 349.




when life begins.3 5 9 The extent of this attempt is alarming.36° As the Court
noted in Everson, civil strife is likely to result when religion seeks or main-
tains the support of government. 361 As the Court has indicated, government
support of religious causes results in the diversion of secular resources from
secular needs and into ecclesiastical disputes.362 The current debate regard-
ing abortion is unquestionably diverting time, money, and effort from the
advancement of crucial secular policies.363
5. Antiabortion Statutes Do Not Fall within the Historical Exemption to
the Establishment Clause
While a statute need fail only one prong of the Lemon test to be consid-
ered unconstitutional,364 some antiabortion statutes would seem to violate
all three prongs of the Lemon test, as well as the political divisiveness test.
The remaining factor for the court's consideration of such a statute in the
establishment clause context is whether the abortion regulation has a histori-
cal basis. Under Lynch and Marsh, if abortion regulations based on the be-
lief that life begins at conception had a long history of coexistence with
secular institutions, such statutes would be allowed to stand regardless of
their outcome under the Lemon test.365 Antiabortion statutes seem to fail
the historical element of the establishment clause analysis as well. 366 This
does not mean, however, that states must adopt a complete hands-off ap-
proach to abortion.
III. USING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS AN ALTERNATIVE
RESOLUTION TO THE ABORTION DEBATE: ADVANTAGES TO
JUDGES, ABORTION RIGHTS ADVOCATES AND THE
ANTIABORTION MOVEMENT
While there appears to be little agreement as to whether life begins at
conception, the test of viability appears a more logical basis for state regula-
tion of abortion. Unlike problems posed by statutes based on potentially
359. See A. MERTON, supra note 345, at 1-2.
360. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
361. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947).
362. See supra note 159.
363. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 226, at 147-50 (discussing the effect of the abortion
issue on the 1976 presidential elections).
364. Valuari, supra note 51, at 142.
365. See supra notes 204-13 and accompanying text.
366. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-52 (1973) ("It perhaps is not generally appreciated
that the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of states today are of relatively
recent vintage." Id. at 129; Brief of 281 American Historians, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605); L. TRIBE, supra note 226, at 27-51.
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religious definitions of when life begins, statutes based on viability pose a
stronger argument that the state is attempting to protect the life of a citi-
zen.367 Because viability is, by definition, the point at which a fetus may
survive on its own,368 the state can establish an independent, medical basis
for claiming a right to protect life.369 A viability test derived from uniform
application of a secular definition of when life begins would not only be con-
sistent with the establishment clause, but would also have positive implica-
tions for both supporters and opponents of abortion. Judges, however, are
the most likely to benefit.
For judges, the use of a viability test, derived from application of the es-
tablishment clause, has important implications, providing an alternative
analysis on the abortion issue; this analysis is not associated with substantive
due process rights and constitutional penumbras. 370 First, the establishment
clause offers judges a textual basis on which to ground their opinions. Also,
unlike the presumptions underlying Roe, the establishment clause offers
clear and thorough tests on which sound and consistent decisions may rest.
The result offers a rational and legally supportable alternative with which to
judicially resolve the abortion debate. It must be acknowledged that while
this test is unlikely to eliminate debate surrounding the abortion issue, it
allows the courts to remove themselves from the controversy. Courts have
been likely targets in the abortion debate because of the weak legal argu-
ments underlying Roe. 371' The use of the establishment clause would remove
this magnet for criticism, allowing judges to declare that their decisions are
based on sound precedent and should stand under the doctrine of stare deci-
sis. While at least one leading scholar has rejected this approach, 372 it ap-
367. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
368. WEBSTER'S THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2548 (1966) ("viable... b of a
fetus: having attained such form and development of organs as to be normally capable of
living outside the uterus... " Id).
369. See infra note 374.
370. See supra note 20.
371. See, e.g., Loewy, Why Roe v. Wade Should Be Overruled, 67 N.C.L. REv. 939 (1989)
("The unique wrongness of Roe lies in its utter lack of support from any source that is legiti-
mate for constitutional interpretation .... (emphasis in original).
372. In his recent book, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes, Professor Tribe states:
"[A]s a matter of constitutional law, a question such as [abortion], having an ir-
reducibly moral dimension, cannot properly be kept out of the political realm merely
because many religions and organized religious groups inevitably take strong posi-
tions on it. Religious views and groups played prominent roles [in supporting the
temperence movement, and opposing slavery and the Vietnam War] .... The partici-
pation of religious groups in political dialogue has never been constitutional anath-
ema .... Thus, the theological source of beliefs about the point at which human life
begins should not cast a constitutional shadow across whatever laws a state might
adopt to restrict abortions that occur beyond that point.
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pears that there is growing judicial support for an expanded role for the
establishment clause in deciding challenges to antiabortion statutes.37 3
For abortion rights advocates, use of the establishment clause would con-
tinue to allow women to have abortions up to the point of viability. 374 Abor-
L. TRIBE, supra note 226, at 116.
It appears, however, that Tribe falls into the same trap as the Court did in McRae. See
supra note 246 and accompanying text. While religious groups may be active participants in
the political process, the resulting statute must, nonetheless, be consistent with the establish-
ment clause. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694-96 (1970). Provided that a religious
group seeks to pass a law with a secular purpose, there would appear to be no violation of the
establishment clause. Thus, even though organized religious groups were active in opposing
slavery and the Vietnam War, the purpose of the legislation sought was secular: In the case of
slavery and the Vietnam War, saving and bettering the lives of humans who were, without
question, living human beings.
In contrast, the temperance movement, although there may have been some secular pur-
poses, would appear to have been at least partially motivated by religious purposes. See
KROUT, THE ORIGINS OF PROHIBITION 101-23 (1925). The demise of the eighteenth amend-
ment, however, indicates the weakness of laws based on religious views.
Unlike slavery, the Vietnam War, and larceny statutes, see supra note 246 and accompany-
ing text, abortion is quite a different case; there is no identifiable secular purpose. The stated
secular purpose is to protect human life, but until the point of viability there is no secular basis
to maintain that there is a life to protect, only beliefs shaped and motivated by religion. As
such, the stated secular purpose is undermined and revealed as little more than the protection
not of life, but a religious belief regarding life. The problem with antiabortion statutes is not
that they seek to protect life, but that the definition of life they seek to protect is one based on
religious beliefs.
373. During the legislative debate regarding Guam's antiabortion statute, a legislator com-
mented that his support for the bill was based on his belief that Guam is "a Christian commu-
nity." Guam Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al., v. Ada, No. 90-00013 at 6 (D.
Guam, August 23, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). While the district court's opinion
held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the privacy rights defined in Roe,
it commented that the legislator's remarks:
[call] to mind the 1856 admonition of Chief Justice Black of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, as quoted by Justice Brennan: 'The manifest object of the men who
framed the institutions of this country was to have a State without religion, and a
Church without politics - that is to say, they meant that one should never be used
as an engine for any purpose of the other, and that no man's rights in one should be
tested by his opinions about the other. As the Church takes no note of men's polit-
ical differences, so the state looks with equal eye on all the modes of religious
faith.... Our fathers seem to have been perfectly sincere in their belief that the
members of the Church would be more patriotic, and the citizens of the state more
religious, by keeping their respective functions entirely separate."
Id. at 6 n. 1 (citations omitted); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3082-
83 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra note 16 (for the substance of Justice Stevens'
view).
374. Because the point of viability has changed only slightly, courts will likely still permit a
woman to have an abortion through the second trimester. While medical assistance has ren-
dered increased survival rates for infants born at 24-28 weeks, the lack of capillary develop-
ment, which would accommodate oxygen transfer, limits survival rates below 24 weeks. Brief
of American Medical Ass'n at 7, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989).
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tion rights advocates, however, under a scheme focusing on viability as a
result of a secular decision to protect viable life, might have to concede the
right of the state to require abortions occurring late in the second trimester
to be carried on in a medical facility,3 75 as well as the right to require exami-
nations to determine viability. Such legislation, however, would have to be
motivated by the secular purpose of protecting viable human life, not by an
attempt to protect a religiously defined life.
The use of the establishment clause to adjudicate abortion cases also offers
benefits to antiabortion advocates. First, one of the major objections posed
by antiabortion advocates, that the Court's current abortion pronounce-
ments, based on Roe, lack a textual basis, is resolved by relying on the text of
the first amendment's establishment clause.
Second, the development of a comprehensive series of laws focusing on
viability, thus consistent with the establishment clause, would mandate that
a state exercise its interest in the viable fetus not only in the area of abortion,
but also in the areas of wrongful death actions and homicide prosecutions.
This might not be the case if a state were permitted to regulate abortion
based on the religious views of its voters.376 Under the Court's decision in
Roe, while the state was entitled to exercise its compelling state interest at
the time of viability, the state was by no means required to do so.377 Under
current law, therefore, it would be possible to pass, consistent with some
religious views, a law that permitted abortion until the time of live birth.3 71
The establishment clause, unlike current law, would invalidate such a statute
because it would be based on the advancement of a particular religious be-
lief.379 Thus, unlike traditional arguments regarding abortion,380 the estab-
lishment clause viability test assures comprehensive protection of fetal life
which reaches the point of viability.38
375. See supra note 326 for the rationale of requiring second trimester abortions to be
performed in medical facilities.
376. Some religions believe that life does not begin until the infant emerges from the body
of the mother. This is the belief held by many Jewish Americans. Brief Amicus Curiae for
American Jewish Congress at 15, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989).
377. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) ("For the stage subsequent to viability, the
State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion...").
378. For an example of a religion believing that life does not begin until birth see supra
note 376.
379. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987).
380. See supra note 20.
381. See supra notes 319-29 and accompanying text.
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Third, by focusing on viability, if, as Justice O'Connor predicts, 382 medi-
cal technology shortens the period between conception and viability, the
number of abortions would continue to decrease over time.383 Fourth, the
use of the viability test would not coerce those who believe that life begins at
conception into compromising those beliefs; as they can under Roe, those
religiously opposed to abortion could continue to refuse to have abortions.
Finally, the continuing strength of the establishment clause also strongly
benefits religious institutions that oppose abortions by preventing the prefer-
ence of one religion over another, thus assuring the ability of all denomina-
tions to seek new members. As the recent growth in the prestige of Christian
groups indicates,384 antiabortion advocates have an effective alternative to
legislatively imposing their views on the public, gaining support for the prop-
osition that life begins at conception through increased membership. In-
deed, one of the major principles underlying the establishment clause was
that voluntary acceptance of a religious creed is more likely to increase
membership than is coercion.38 5
IV. CONCLUSION
While Thomas Jefferson's image of a wall standing between church and
state seems fairly straightforward, the Court has spent close to half a century
attempting to define the parameters of Jefferson's wall. While several of the
court's early decisions reached incompatible results in nearly identical suits,
the trend in establishment clause analysis has favored increasing consistency.
Since 1971, Lemon v. Kurtzman has been consistently relied upon by the
Court in determining establishment clause questions. While questions re-
garding historical exemptions, endorsement, and the role of the political di-
visiveness test persist, the three-prong Lemon test remains intact and
undiminished. It is the Lemon test's stability and continuous support that
makes it appealing for use in settling the abortion debate.
382. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 457-58
(1983).
383. While discussions about artificial wombs are intriguing, in the nearly two decades
since Roe was decided, the point of viability has not changed, and is not likely to change in the
foreseeable future. See L. TRIBE, supra note 226, at 220-21.
384. Jerry Falwell's Crusade; Fundamentalist Legions seek to remake Church and Society,
TIME, Sept. 2, 1985 at 48.
385. As Madison warned in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments, "Does the policy of this Bill tend to lessen the disproportion [between believers and
non-believers]? No; it at once discourages those who are strangers to the light of [revelation]
from coming into the Region of it .... " J. MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENT (1795), reprinted in Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S.
664, 725-26 (1970).
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The turmoil resulting from the current debate and indecision regarding
abortion requires a new approach. The use of the establishment clause, fo-
cusing on viability, will not, in itself, end the abortion debate. It does, how-
ever, offer a stable point at which all parties can agree there is a life to
protect. Moreover, it gives the state a secularly, rather than a religiously,
based test for exercising its interest in human life. In a religiously pluralistic
society, compromise is a necessity, not a luxury, and the use of the establish-
ment clause offers such a compromise. Both sides must be willing to surren-
der some ground, for continuing to pursue absolutes is doomed to failure.
For the courts, using the establishment clause would allow them to hand
down a concrete and well founded decision which provides freedom of reli-
gion for all and coercion of none.
John Morton Cummings, Jr.
